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ABSTRACT This paper examines price expectation adjustment of house buyers and sellers to rapid
changes in the housing market using data from Scotland where houses are sold through ‘first-price
sealed-bid’ auctions. These auctions provide more information on market signals, incentives and the
behaviour of market participants than private treaty sales. This paper therefore provides a
theoretical framework for analysing revealed preference data generated from these auctions.
We specifically focus on the analysis of the selling to asking price difference, the ‘bid-premium’. The
bid-premium is shown to be affected by expectations of future price movements, market duration and
high bidding frequency. The bid-premium reflects consumer’s expectations, adapting to market
conditions more promptly than asking price setting behaviour and final sale prices. The volatile
conditions of the recent housing market bubble are fully reflected in the bid-premium, whereas the
asking and sale prices are much less prone to rapid movements.
KEY WORDS: Housing markets, price expectations, auctions, bid-premium
Introduction
Price expectations adjustment by buyers and sellers to rapid changes in the housing market
is an increasingly important issue given the recent volatile conditions of the housing boom
and subsequent bust. Housing auctions can be helpful in examining this issue as they
provide more information on market signals, incentives and behaviour of market
participants than private treaty sales. The issue of housing auctions and sale mechanism
has been theoretically and empirically examined in the literature (Lusht, 1996; Stevenson
& Young, 2004; Stevenson et al., 2010) including the probability of resulting in a sale
(Ong et al., 2005) and the effects on the final sale price (Dotzour et al., 1998; Mayer,
1998). In market boom conditions and locations where demand is high relative to supply,
the seller will be in a stronger bargaining position relative to the buyer. Glaeser et al.
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(2008) and Goodman and Thibodeau (2008) indicate that housing market bubbles are
exacerbated where housing supply is price inelastic.
Setting an asking price is crucial in marketing a house. The asking price affects the
number of viewings by potential purchasers per time period (Arnold, 1999). Setting a low
asking price might attract more prospective buyers, but also lowers perceived valuation
(Horowitz, 1992; Knight et al., 1994). Higher asking prices may generate higher bids, but
also may reduce the probability of finding a buyer whose valuation of the property is above
the seller’s reservation price. Sellers wish to maximise sale price and complete their
transaction in as short a time period as possible (Yavas & Yang, 1995). Nonetheless, the
role of market agents is important (Smith et al., 2006), having a significant effect on the
expectations of the seller and on setting the asking price. The sale probability can also be
affected by the length of time the house has been on the market, the distribution of offers
and the seller’s reservation price (Haurin, 1988; Pryce & Gibb, 2006; Yavas & Yang,
1995; Zuehlke, 1987). Pryce (2011) also finds that the degree of overpricing is positively
correlated with market duration.
This paper examines the consumers’ speculative behaviour, focusing on the demand
side of the housing market and its selling mechanisms. We take advantage of the Scottish
system’s uniqueness, where the vast majority of the house sales are conducted in first-price
sealed-bid auctions,1 with the bids usually being above the asking price. A theoretical
framework is developed for analysing the data generated from these auctions, including
and distinguishing between the different incentives and signals for the seller and buyer.
This is accomplished by focusing on a specific price component, i.e. the difference
between asking and final selling price, henceforth called the ‘bid-premium’. The analysis
of the different information contained in asking prices and selling prices provides the basis
for examining the bid-premium. We examined whether this price component behaves
differently to selling and asking prices, especially through the period of high inflation in
the housing market and the subsequent market reaction to the first signs of trouble.
The characteristics of the first-price sealed-bid auctions are discussed along with
Scottish market conditions before the theoretical framework and modelling section. The
paper structure is as follows: Section 2 discusses the first-price sealed-bid auction system
and the housing market in Scotland, the theoretical framework is developed in Section 3
and data issues are illustrated in Section 4. The modelling and results are discussed in
Section 5 followed by the concluding section.
The Auction Sale Mechanism and the Scottish Housing Market
Auctions are a popular house sale mechanism in Ireland (Stevenson et al., 2010), Australia
(Lusht, 1996) and New Zealand (Dotzour et al., 1998), predominantly at the premium end
of these markets. These countries employ open outcry auctions in contrast to Scotland’s
first-price sealed-bid auctions. Auctions are primarily used in the context of foreclosure
and bankruptcy sales in the USA (Mayer, 1998) and Singapore (Ong et al., 2005). To our
knowledge, there is no equivalent to the Scottish house sale system; therefore, one can
reasonably expect that housing market participants in Scotland exhibit behavioural
differences to participants in countries where different auction mechanisms or private
treaty sales are used.
Game theory provides paradigms of distinctive revenue outcomes in specific cases,
normally depending upon the private or common value of the commodity and the risk
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attitudes of the involved parties. However, we have not found in the literature a game
theory model that fully captures the complexities of the Scottish housing market.
Nevertheless, looking at this literature can provide some helpful insights.
For example, a common issue with both sealed-bid and open outcry auctions, where
bidders are uncertain about the commodity value, is that the highest bidder often
overestimates the value and overbids. The seller will strictly prefer the first price to the
open outcry auction, with the former yielding a higher expected price, when risk-averse
bidders with private values2 are assumed (Milgrom &Weber, 1982). This is not generally
true in a common values3 setting, where less aggressive bids are induced, because the
value of the object is affected by the information held by other bidders (Menicucci, 2004).
Even in the case of risk-neutral individuals with private values, the laboratory analysis of
Kirchkamp et al. (2009) found that an outside substitute option significantly magnified the
revenue premium of the first-price auction because overbidding in first-price auctions is
more prominent with outside options than without.
The analysis of Milgrom andWeber (1982) predicted that for first-price and open outcry
auctions with bidders’ risk-neutral common value, providing full information is the best
policy for the seller. Neugebauer and Perote (2007), in a first-price auction with private
values experiment, found that feedback information on winning bids triggers an
immediate response in bidding behaviour. Subjects anchor on the winning bid as if it was
the price to be paid in the market. Hence, subjects learn to bid on the basis of this winning
bid rather than by reflecting on their values. In contrast to the bidding behaviour, in the no
information feedback treatment, Neugebauer and Perote (2007) found that the revelation
of the lagged winning bid triggers an immediate response in terms of higher bidding. This
is highly relevant to the Scottish housing market because house price levels in local
markets are determined by the winning bid and not the whole range of bids.
We can assume that most house buyers are uncertain about the value of the house they
are buying. However, there are periods in the housing market when buyers expect future
price appreciation, and conversely when they think that prices will decrease. Hence, house
value uncertainty can move in a particular direction given the market circumstances.
In times of price inflation, we expect an exacerbation of higher value bids and the reverse
when price levels fall.
Auctions in Housing Markets
The use of auctions in the housing market hinges on the fundamental question of whether
there is a premium to the seller. Empirical evidence broadly indicates that there is an auction
premium in markets operating through open outcry auctions. Lusht (1996) and Newell et al.
(1993) argue for such a premium in the Melbourne and Sydney markets, whereas Dotzour
et al.’s (1998) findings for Christchurch, New Zealand, support this notion. Stevenson et al.
(2010) also found that auctioned properties tend to sell at a premium in Dublin.
The importance of the number of bidders in obtaining higher prices at an open outcry
auction in real estate is underlined by Lusht (1996), Ong (2006) and Stevenson et al.
(2010), while Ooi et al. (2006) report that the number of bidders impacts upon sale prices
in the context of sealed-bid auctions. In the Scottish system, Levin and Pryce (2007) argue
that during boom periods, extreme bids for houses can be observed, where the highest bid
will be significantly higher than the mean of the distribution of bids for the property.
Expectation Adjustment in the Housing Market 3
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Pryce (2011) applies a multiple fractional polynomial estimation to examine the degree
of overpricing in Glasgow. The degree of overpricing is defined as the percentage
difference between the asking price and the ‘expected selling price’ (a hedonic price
estimate). He finds that market conditions can affect selling strategy and that sellers may
opt for setting a fixed price when the market is relatively weak.
The Scottish System
In Scotland, the sealed-bid auction is the dominant mechanism through which buyers and
sellers reach a price. Auction participants submit a bid on the basis of a professional
valuation and an ‘offers-over’ price set by the seller. Pryce and Gibb (2006) state, ‘the
offers-over price is typically set so that the auction will produce a successful outcome’
(p. 380). The asking price is not legally binding, and the reservation price is often not
revealed by the seller. The asking price is set by the vendor in consultation with his/her
real estate agent at a level that will attract potential buyers and generate a bidding process.
The signal sent by the offers-over asking price in the Scottish system is different from
systems in other countries. In England and the US, for example, most houses transact
below their asking prices; thus, the asking price is seen as a ceiling price.
Unlike the open outcry auction, the date of a sealed-bid auction in Scotland is not pre-set
and is only set when the seller’s solicitor receives two or more ‘notes of interest’ (Pryce &
Gibb, 2006; Pryce, 2011). The bids are revealed to the seller after the ‘closing date’ for
offers has elapsed. At the time of bid submission, the potential buyers do not know the
number of auction participants, but they are aware of the number of ‘notes of interest’.
Hence, the bidders have an indication of the level of interest that exists for the property.
The seller is not required to set a closing date and can enter into private negotiations
with the first interested party. The ‘private treaty’ or ‘fixed price’ selling mechanism can
also be adopted at the start of the marketing process. This may occur because, first, the
seller may require a quick sale. Choosing a fixed price reduces buyer uncertainty. Second,
the seller may consider that there is a low probability of the auction attracting many
bidders due to property characteristics, location and/or general market conditions (Pryce,
2011). This is consistent with Mayer (1995).
House price inflation in the Scottish housing market in the run-up to 2007 was partly
triggered by the perceived investment potential of housing (Smith et al., 2006). Smith et al.
(2006) have argued that the behaviour of market agents contributed to the significant house
price inflation in Edinburgh between 1996 and 2003. Market agents did not know what
potential buyers should offer when the market was experiencing rapid change. This would
further increase the probability of overbidding, which in conjunction with perceived
investment potential, may have contributed to the price inflation witnessed in the housing
market.
Theoretical Framework
This section demonstrates the conceptual differences in incentives and behaviour between
sellers and buyers specifically in the Scottish housing auction system.
The first step in the modelling process is to employ the hedonic pricing (HP) method to
determine the factors affecting the selling price. HP considers housing as a composite
commodity, with the neighbourhood4 characteristics of the locality being important along
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with the structural characteristics of the property. This is a popular method in real-estate
research (Pryce & Gibb, 2006; Watkins, 2001; Zuehlke, 1987).
The price P of the house i, in the mth residential location is given by:
Pim ¼ f ðXimÞ; ð1Þ
where Xi are the structural and neighbourhood characteristics of house, i, in the
neighbourhood m. We employed the common log-linear transformation as it provides the
best fit to the data:
lnðpiÞ ¼ ai þ Xibþ Tic þ 1i; ð2Þ
where b is a vector of the coefficients for the characteristics of house i, T is a time
dummies indicator matrix controlling for the nominal aspect of sales prices and c is a
vector of parameters capturing this nominal price evolution.
At the level of individual auction, the selling price p of house j can be decomposed into:
pj ¼ kj þ bj; ð3Þ
where kj is the asking price and bj is the difference between the selling and asking price, or
bid-premium in this research context. The seller sets an asking price, kj, that maximises
his/her expected value of the bid-premium. This is conditional on the matrix of housing
attributes, Xj, and housing market conditions at time t
*
j as perceived by the seller:
kj ¼ {Xj; t*j : max½EðbjÞ}: ð4Þ
The asking price here is a function of housing attributes, a common assumption in HP. The
asking price reflects the common value of a combination of housing attributes held in the
market place up until t*j . t
*
j is very important because by putting the house on sale, the
seller expects that given the perceived current market conditions he/she will receive at
least the reservation price that is not necessarily kj, but is less than pj. We do not speculate
about the information available to or the process used by sellers to assess market
conditions.
Price setting is not done in a vacuum or completely governed by strategic behaviour of
individuals with private values. If the seller hopes to maximise the selling price, he/she has
to price according to the housing market conditions and a perception of a common value in
the market, often conforming to ‘expert advice’. Conversely, if the seller has a high private
value for the house and does not conform, the probability of sale will be significantly
reduced, which will be reflected in the time on the market (TOM) or will be unsuccessful
and not available in our observed sales data. Any strategic behaviour of setting the asking
price by a rational seller can only affect and will aim to maximise the number of auction
participants hj and minimise TOM jj:
max½EðbjÞjXjt*j
n o
) maxðhjÞ þminðjjÞ: ð5Þ
There may be a perception of a strategic benefit to setting an asking price below the
reservation price. However, this is a balancing act as the attributes Xj of the house and the
market conditions are common knowledge for auction participants. A very low asking
price that is disparate to similar properties or to the perceived common value of Xj in the
market at t*j , can also signal a lower bargaining position (e.g. unseen problems with the
property, financial issues, time constraints) of the seller. Hence, setting a very low asking
Expectation Adjustment in the Housing Market 5
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price, much below the reservation price may not necessarily attract more bidders or reduce
TOM (see for example Campbell et al., 2009; Haurin et al., 2008).
Looking at the incentives of the buyer, he/she would aim to minimise the bid-premium.
The available signals to the buyer, given his/her decision to participate in an auction for
the house j with attributes Xj, are the number of auction participants hj, TOM jj, the asking
price kj and the market conditions at tj. This is expressed as:
{min½EðbjÞjkj; tj; hj; jj}: ð6Þ
The housing attributes Xj are common knowledge among auction participants, and the
asking price kj internalises Xj. In this first-price sealed-bid auction, it is the expectation that
potential buyers with a reservation price below kj will not participate in the auction.
The very few observations in which the bid-premium is negative in our data are attributed
to data error or problematic asking price setting behaviour by the seller.
The market conditions at the time of the auction tj can be different from the conditions at
asking price setting time t*j . It is very important when there are rapid price movements in
the market, such as the recent volatile conditions in the housing market. In our data, the
time between setting the asking price and selling the house, or TOM, is about 52 days on
average. In conditions of high market inflation, one will expect increased disparity
between asking and sales prices just due to this reason. Conversely, a shock in the market,
say a rapid deflation, will decrease this gap.
TOM is another important signal to the buyer as longer TOM can be considered as a
disadvantage for the seller. This can be interpreted by the buyer as either the specific
combination of attributes Xj is not widely sought after in the current market conditions or
the asking price setting by the seller was too high. In either case, the seller will tend
towards a lower price offer, ceteris paribus. Conversely, a house that just came into the
market can be considered a bargain, pushing potential buyers to higher offers especially
where there is interest by many market participants.
This leads to the other important signal, the number of auction participants hj. The buyer
would strictly prefer less or no competition from other potential buyers. Rephrasing, there
is a strict preference from the buyer’s perspective to a private treaty directly negotiating
with the seller than a first-price sealed-bid auction. Hence, the auction system in Scotland
is geared towards sellers in properties and/or market conditions that attract interest by
multiple prospective buyers. Gibb (1992) suggests that the seller can use the sealed-bid
system to capture the buyer’s economic rent. In the data section below, in times of
economic downturn, the percentage of private treaty sales is very high, whereas after 2004,
it drops to an unprecedented low, well below 10 per cent. This is also consistent with the
literature that finds a premium in markets operating through auctions (Dotzour et al., 1998;
Lusht, 1996; Newell et al., 1993; Stevenson et al., 2010).
The second stage of the two-stage model of bid-premium is derived by Equation (4),
being shaped by buyer behaviour. However, because the bid-premium is conditional on the
asking price, we expect the asking price to be endogenous to the bid-premium as more
expensive houses will exhibit higher bid-premiums in absolute value and lower percentage
difference between asking and selling price. Hence, the first stage model is derived by
Equation (2) that reflects the seller’s behaviour in setting the asking price that is
conditional to the vector of the housing attributes. The two-stage model of bid-premium
6 S. Thanos & M. White
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [N
ott
ing
ha
m 
Tr
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
7:3
5 0
9 M
ay
 20
13
 
(bi) is given as:
lnðbiÞ ¼ ai þ gki þ Tic þ lhi þ hji þ ui; ð7Þ
lnðkiÞ ¼ ai þ Zibþ T*i c þ 1i; ð8Þ
where Zi is a matrix of housing characteristics uncorrelated with the error term ui. Ti and T
*
i
are time dummies indicator matrices for the time of sale and the time of asking price
setting. hi is the number of auction participants, ji is TOM and ki is the asking price. g, g
and h are the coefficients of asking price, number of auction participants and TOM,
respectively.
Even though our approach has a similar starting point to Pryce (2011), there are several
differences. Most importantly, the percentage difference is examined between the asking
price and the ‘expected selling price’ that is a hedonic price estimate. A priori assumptions
are made about the asking price setting behaviours of the sellers, who explicitly use this
percentage difference between asking and selling prices in their area to determine their
asking price. However, it is difficult for sellers to accurately calculate this difference as
they are often looking at houses with different characteristics. Another assumption is the
dominating role of the real estate agents who get most sellers to conform to ‘local market
conventions’ that dictate the asking/selling price percentage difference in specific areas.
However, there are no data to test the effects of different estate agents and whether they are
imposing different local market conventions. We also point to the relevant observation of
Smith et al. (2006) that market agents did not know what potential buyers should offer
when the market was experiencing rapid change. Lastly, there is the issue of asking price
endogeneity to asking/selling price percentage that cannot be directly addressed given the
type of variables of our data set.
Data
Data Description
The data used in this study cover the housing market in Aberdeen, in North East Scotland,
and were provided by Aberdeen Solicitors Property Centre. The dataset contains
information on asking and selling prices, structural characteristics of the property, location
and duration on the market. The Geographical Information System was used to derive
spatial variables such as distance to the central train station and the airport, dwelling
density and socioeconomic characteristics on the level of census output area (COA). While
the dataset runs from 1984, this study focuses on the period from 2004 to 2007, with the
dataset containing 19 2905 transactions across the city. The reason for focusing in this
timeframe is a significant shift in market behaviour after 2004, compared to previous
years, as shown in Section 4.2.
Only 6.8 per cent (1320) of the houses were sold through private treaty. This was a very
small part of the sample, not allowing analysis that has any statistical significance on the
choice of sale mechanism. This is also observed in Stevenson et al. (2010), where the
inverse Mills Ratio (Lee, 1982) derived from a probit model was not statistically
significant in their hedonic price models. Hence, there was no sample selection bias due to
the endogeneity of sale mechanism selection even though 25.9 per cent of their sample was
sold through private treaty.
Expectation Adjustment in the Housing Market 7
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The subsequent discussion and modelling is focused on the 17 354 house sales in which
the sale price exceeded the asking price dropping, except the private treaty sales, 3.2 per
cent of the data with negative bid-premia. These observations constitute outliers that either
reflect data error or unrealistic expectations and poor understanding of the auction process
or properties with unique and rare characteristics that do not provide any insight to the
process under examination. We recognise that there might be a possibility of selection bias
because the private treaty option exists not only at the start of the selling process, but at any
point prior to sale. However, we do not have any information to test this, and the
percentage that opted for private treaty in our study period was very small. In any case, this
study focuses and only produces estimates for houses sold through first-price sealed-bid
auctions. A description of each variable is found in Appendix A, with Appendix B
providing descriptive statistics.
Short and Long Term Bid-premium Movements Relative to Asking Price
Figure 1 illustrates both the bid-premium as a percentage of the asking price each year
from 1985 to 2007 and the percentage of all houses sold by private treaty. Falling oil prices
in the mid-1980s caused the supply of houses on the market to rise relative to demand.
The bid-premium increased to approximately 10 per cent by 1992 as demand rose relative
to supply. At the same time, the percentage of private treaty sales fell from over 20 per cent
to less than 10 per cent. Although the nation’s economy had gone into recession in 1990–
1991, this was not the case in the local housing market or in the local economy of
Aberdeen (see Harris et al. (1986) and Jones and Maclennan (1986) for a discussion of the
Aberdeen economy and housing market). The bid-premium fell after 1992 and remained
below 5 per cent between 1995 and 2001. Private treaty sales accounted for between 20
and 25 per cent of all sales during this period. After this period, we saw significant
Figure 1. The bid premium (%) and private treaty sales (per cent of total); yearly 1985–2007.
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increases in the bid-premium. From 2003 onwards, the bid-premium was in excess of 10
per cent and rose to almost 35 per cent of the asking price by 2006, although the rate of
increase in the bid-premium decreased between 2006 and 2007. Private treaty sales fell to
a historic low during this later period. This signified a significant shift to consumer
behaviour that could be partly explained by the increasing perceived investment potential
in the housing market as argued by Smith et al. (2006).
Looking at the 2004–2007 period in detail at quarterly intervals, Figure 2 shows that
bid-premium does not fall below 15 per cent of the asking price at any point, while private
treaty sales fluctuate just over 5 per cent between 2004 and 2006 and remain below 10 per
cent until 2007, third quarter. From the beginning of 2005, we observe a strong positive
trend until the peak in the first quarter of 2007 at around 35 per cent of the asking price,
which is remarkable in a historic context.
Early signs of bad debt in the financial sector appear in the third quarter of 2007, which
was the first indication that something was seriously wrong with the housing market.
Hence, the bid-premium percentage falling and the private treaty sales proportion
increasing after the second quarter of 2007 is no surprise. Nevertheless, this still does not
show a return to the pre-2004 situation. The bid-premium percentage is still above 20 per
cent, and private treaty sales proportion does not exceed 15 per cent.
It is clear that the distribution has shifted to the right from the first quarter of 2004 to the
first quarter of 2007. The bid-premium to asking price ratio in the first quarter of 2007 is
statistically significantly6 higher than that in 2004, with the mean in 2007 (42.7 per cent)
being almost two standard deviations to the right of the mean in 2004 (18.6 per cent).
Neither in the short nor in the long term, shown in Figures 1 and 2, was there any
significant institutional change in the selling system. There is no evidence that the new
sellers’ surveys, required by the end of the time period, impacted on pricing strategy.
Figure 2. The bid premium (per cent) and private treaty sales (per cent of total); quarterly
2004–2007.
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However, the cycles in the local Aberdeen economy might have also been dictated by
investment in the offshore oil and gas industry. Waves of new investment coincide with
periods of house price inflation such that the local housing market often performs
differently from the national economy (Wilson et al., 2011). Thus, market conditions
significantly affect the amount of bids offered over the asking price. This also drives the
inverse relationship between the bid premium and the proportion of private treaty sales
that shifted radically after 2004.
Estimation and Results
This section presents the results of empirical estimation, starting with the HP models.
A discussion of the methodological considerations and the results of the two-stage bid-
premium model follow. The section concludes by bringing together the HP and the two-
stage bid-premium model results over the study period.
HP Models
Except for the HP model in Equation (2), we also estimated an HP model where the
dependent variable is the asking price instead of the selling price. The justification for this
is to explore the factors affecting the asking price setting behaviour. The only difference in
specification between the two models is the replacement of the sale period dummy matrix
with one for the period when the house was entered onto the market.
The sale and asking price HP model results are presented in Appendices C and D,
respectively. Both models have a very good overall fit, explaining 82 per cent of the data
variation. Almost all coefficients have the expected signs a priori and most are statistically
significant at the 95 per cent level. The results of the two models are very similar, with the
selling price HP model providing only marginally better overall data fit. This is in line with
the argument in Section 3 that compared to the sale price, the asking price ki accurately
captures the arguments in Equation (3) and in the second stage internalises the housing
attributes Xi.
Double glazing would be expected to have a positive effect on house price; yet, its
coefficient is negative in our models. This may be attributed to this variable capturing
noise effects7 and/or locational characteristics not captured by other variables as double
glazing is also less likely in some larger older properties that tend to be concentrated in the
most expensive locations.
We did not include TOM in the HP models as it would raise theoretical issues. If we
were to include TOM, it would be the only variable exhibiting noticeable differences
between asking and sale price HP models. The TOM coefficient would be statistically
significant in both models, negative in the selling price HP and positive in the asking price
HP. This denotes the negative effect of a longer marketing period on sale price and that
houses with higher asking prices take longer to sell, ceteris paribus.
Methodological Considerations in the Bid-premium Model
The two-stage model is specified according to Equations (7) and (8) in Section 3.
The model includes dummy variables for each quarter, from 2004 to the end of 2007, with
the fourth quarter of 2007 being the base category. The discussion in Section 4.2 also
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confirms that the change of market conditions over time affects bid-premium levels. TOM
is included in the bid-premium model as it is an important signal to the buyer.
The number of auction participants should have a significant effect on the price
achieved in an auction, but unfortunately, we do not have any available data on the number
of bids per auction. Dwelling density is employed as a proxy for this factor given that in
areas with denser population, we expect higher concentration of bidders, ceteris paribus.
A corollary to this is, as Green et al. (2005) show, supply elasticity and population density
are negatively related. Therefore, in densely populated areas where housing supply is price
inelastic, we expect exacerbation of over bidding and of housing market bubbles (Glaeser
et al., 2008). The dwelling density variable might also be capturing this effect; hence, it is
included in the model.
As seen in Equation (8), the asking price is also expected to be endogenous to the bid-
premium as houses with higher asking prices will attract higher bids and bid-premiums.
This endogeneity then needs to be tested and the asking price instrumented, if that is the
case. The selection of appropriate instruments was an iterative procedure of testing a
combination of housing characteristics that would be uncorrelated with the error term ui in
Equation (7). We examined attributes with the least variation between asking and sale HP
models and found these to be neighbourhood/socioeconomic characteristics. The best
results were achieved by using as instruments the variables distance to airport,
unemployment in the area, garden, areas with a majority of social or privately rented
houses, with 30 per cent of people having no qualifications and the majority of households
not owning a car.
Most of the neighbourhood/socioeconomic data were only available at the COA level of
spatial disaggregation as seen in Appendix A. We employed a generalised method of
moments estimator with cluster-robust errors to account for this in our two-stage model
(Baum et al., 2007; Hansen et al., 1996; Wooldridge, 2002). The results of this model are
presented in Table 1, but first, we examine the statistical test for endogeneity and
instrument suitability before the results are discussed.
We can reject at the 99 per cent level, the hypothesis of the asking price not being
endogenous to the bid-premium (Hausman, 1978; Hayashi, 2000). Under-identification is
also rejected at this level (Kleibergen & Paap, 2006), meaning that excluded instruments
are correlated with the endogenous regressor ki. The null hypothesis of no over-
identification cannot be rejected, which denotes that the instruments are uncorrelated with
the error term ui in Equation (7) and were correctly excluded from estimating that
Equation (Hayashi, 2000). The value of the Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald statistic
(Kleibergen & Paap, 2006) when compared to the Stock–Yogo weak identification critical
values (Stock & Yogo, 2005) allows us to reject weak identification or that the instruments
are only weakly correlated with the endogenous regressor.
Bid-premium Model Results
The performance of this model in Table 1 was not expected to rival the HP models as
strategic behaviour and overbidding may be a frequent occurrence in housing auctions,
and proxies are employed in the two-stage model to account for unavailable information.
Nevertheless, the overall goodness of fit is excellent for this type of model, explaining 56
per cent of the data variation. Almost all coefficients are statistically significant at the 99
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per cent level. Furthermore, all proxy variables behave according to expectations, as is
fully demonstrated below.
The asking price has the greatest significance on the bid-premium. The period of sale
has also a very significant effect, as is demonstrated by the dummy variables for the
quarter of sale. Signs on the quarterly dummies go from negative to positive by the second
quarter of 2006, and values increase to a maximum in the second quarter of 2007 before
going down in the subsequent quarter. The time period effects are plotted and compared
with HP price estimates, enabling interesting comparisons in Section 5.4.
The dwelling density coefficient is statistically significant and positive in the two-stage
model. This variable does not reflect here the negative effect of population density on
Table 1. GMM two-stage bid-premium model
Variable Coefficient SEa t-Stat p . t
Asking price 1.005 0.027 37.70 0
2004 q1 20.600 0.034 217.46 0
2004 q2 20.308 0.031 29.95 0
2004 q3 20.505 0.031 216.11 0
2004 q4 20.674 0.034 220.07 0
2005 q1 20.532 0.033 215.94 0
2005 q2 20.319 0.028 211.21 0
2005 q3 20.351 0.029 212.24 0
2005 q4 20.364 0.030 211.97 0
2006 q1 20.128 0.029 24.37 0
2006 q2 0.030 0.027 1.10 0.271
2006 q3 0.085 0.026 3.31 0.001
2006 q4 0.145 0.027 5.27 0
2007 q1 0.366 0.026 13.94 0
2007 q2 0.390 0.026 14.96 0
2007 q3 0.192 0.026 7.52 0
Dwelling density 0.0015 0.000 7.23 0
TOM 20.0027 0.000 25.43 0
Constant 21.367 0.326 24.20 0
Adj. R 2: 0.5646 N: 17 354 F(18, 1663): 645.38 Prob . F: 0.0
Instrumented variable: asking price
Instruments: DIST_AIR UNEMP GARDEN SOCIAL_R PRIVRENT VACANT0 No_quals
NOCARD
Statistical tests on endogeneity and instrument identification Value p-Val.
Underidentification test (Kleibergen–Paap rk LM statistic) x 2
(8)
3420.9 0
Weak identification test (Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald) F statistic 712.9
Stock–Yogo weak ID test critical values
5% maximal IV relative bias 20.3
10% maximal IV size 33.8
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments) x 2
(7)
8.3 0.31
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors, x 2 (1) 67.2 0
a Cluster adjusted standard errors on COA, no. of clusters: 1664.
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house prices as in the HP models. It seems indeed to be a successful proxy for the high
concentration of auction participants and/or inelastic house supply in areas with denser
populations, both of which were expected to have a positive effect on the bid-premium.
TOM is negative and highly significant in the model.
Comparing Hedonic Prices and Bid-premium Levels over the Study Period
The bid-premium levels are plotted over time in Figure 3, along with HP selling and asking
price estimates. The x-axis in Figure 3 signifies the quarter of the sale for the bid-premium
and HP sale price models, whereas for the HP asking price model, it signifies the quarter in
which the property went on the market.
Figure 3 also includes the estimates of a separate HP model on private treaty/negative
bids prices data. As mentioned in Section 4, there were self-selection and outlier issues
with this small proportion of data; thus, they were dropped from the main model. The
detailed model results are found in Appendix E. The results of this private treaty/negative
bids model do not diverge significantly from the HP sale price model, even though the
sample size is comparatively very small. Nonetheless, these estimates should be treated
with caution, and the results are included in Figure 3 for demonstration purposes only.
Three phases of price movements and market conditions can be distinguished in
Figure 3:
(1) The period of relatively lower house price inflation from the beginning of 2004
to the end of 2005.
(2) The high inflation period from 2006 to the second quarter of 2007.
(3) The beginning of the deflation in the final two quarters of 2007.
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Figure 3. Hedonic prices and bid-premium levels.
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In the first phase, we did not see any significant differences between the asking price and
the sale price estimate. The bid-premium did not exhibit a positive trend as all the other HP
estimates did.
The sale prices inflated rapidly in the second phase, whereas asking price increases were
not as steep. Only after the beginning of 2006 did the sale price estimates start to
significantly diverge from the asking prices. The first quarter of 2006 seemed to begin the
final and extreme phase of the bubble in the housing market in Aberdeen. The bid-
premium had a positive trend during this phase. The sale price and bid-premium levels
reached their maximum level in the second quarter of 2007.
The first shock in the housing market came in the third quarter of 2007 when the
‘Northern Rock’ bank was bailed out by the UK government. Immediately after this
incident, was a 32 per cent fall in the bid-premium levels from the second to the fourth
quarter of 2007. The level of the bid-premium in the fourth quarter 2007 adjusted
downwards to the level of the first quarter of 2006. Nevertheless, the sale prices suffered
only a marginal reduction during the last two quarters of 2007. This deflation did not even
adjust the prices to the levels of first quarter of 2007, let alone 2006. Asking prices did not
even register any reductions during the third phase, illustrating the significant lags in the
housing market.
In the second and third phases, the asking price seemed to lag by two to three quarters
behind the sale price levels. These lags were due to the price setting behaviour of the
sellers, who could not adjust their expectations to the rapid changes in the market
conditions. A contributory factor in the slow adjustment may be the heterogeneous and
segmented character of the housing market, which may often be in disequilibrium
(Tu, 2003). Overbidding seems to have been the ‘engine’ of the rapid price increase in
the second phase, which is consistent with experiments by Neugebauer and Perote
(2007) on auction feedback information. This increase and the resulting price
levels were retained even though the bid-premium levels fell significantly in the second
half of 2007.
Conclusions
This paper has examined the adjustment of buyers’ and sellers’ expectations to rapid
changes in the market through the unique opportunity provided by the Scottish real estate
sale mechanism. The Aberdeen dataset included information on asking price and the
winning bid in ‘first-price sealed-bid’ housing auctions. A bid-premium model was
developed, drawing form the literature and HP modelling, because we were not aware of
any bid-premium models or anything equivalent in the literature.
The review of game theory literature demonstrated the potential for overbidding in
‘first-price sealed-bid’ auctions and also showed no incentive for the seller not to disclose
his/her reservation price. The significant effect of a high number of auction participants to
the final sale price was also underlined in the literature. TOM was seen in the literature as
important in influencing bidders’ strategy and final transaction prices.
Following from the above, the bid-premium model was specified as a function of the
asking price, expectations of future price movements, TOM and higher bidding frequency.
The model results were excellent, explaining nearly 56 per cent of the data variation. Even
though proxies were employed to account for unavailable information, almost all
coefficients are statistically significant and of the expected signs.
14 S. Thanos & M. White
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [N
ott
ing
ha
m 
Tr
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
7:3
5 0
9 M
ay
 20
13
 
A distinction between the two price components, asking price and bid-premium, was
demonstrated in this analysis. The bid-premium reflects the buyers’ preferences that
rapidly adjust to the general economic climate, resembling at times the volatility of
financial markets. This is consistent with the argument of Smith et al. (2006) that housing
has been recently regarded as a potential investment, which is implied by the significant
shift in consumer behaviour after 2004. In particular, the second phase of price movements
illustrates the investment driven mentality of consumers, where the housing-market/-
auction participants consistently overbid in expectation of continuously increasing future
payoffs. The bid-premium rapidly adjusts downwards at the first sign of trouble in the
market, with the speed of this adjustment being quite uncharacteristic of the housing
market. Conversely, the asking price component seems to reflect the more conservative
behaviour of sellers, whose expectations lag behind any rapid price movements, but retain
the ‘momentum’ even after the ‘engine is switched off’.
The results show that as Gibb (1992) suggests, the sealed-bid auction helps the seller to
capture the buyer’s surplus. Perhaps surprising is the extent and size of the bid-premium
during the recent market boom. Undoubtedly, liquidity played a role and a key policy
question may be whether or not the government should place a cap on loan-to-value or
loan-to-income ratios. This itself may produce other distributional consequences, which
themselves may require further research before any policy change.
In other countries with different selling systems, boom periods are also fuelled by
liquidity and expectations for future price rises. Similar policy responses as suggested
above may be appropriate for consideration.
Interestingly, the results also show the lagged change in sellers’ expectations in the face
of the market downturn. Thus, as the stock of unsold properties increases, market duration
increases before prices begin to adjust downwards. This may lead to protracted adjustment
in the housing market, and there may be few if any housing policy levers to enable a faster
return to equilibrium.
For future research, the development of a game theory model specifically for the
Scottish housing market, fully capturing its complexities would be very helpful in
analysing sellers’ and buyers’ behaviour. The theoretical framework and empirical
estimation here can be extended to determine how certain behaviours of real-estate agents
affect asking price setting and impose different local market conventions. This paper looks
at the behaviour concerning individual observations of auction results, but does not
examine spatial effects in relation to price setting or final sale price. The next step is to
explicitly model the spatial effects by combining our approach with the methodological
framework in Thanos et al. (2012) and Dube´ and Legros (2011, 2012) that specifically
accounts for spatial dependence in disaggregate house sale data.
Notes
1 The first-price sealed-bid auction is one in which the buyer making the highest bid claims the object and
pays only the amount he has bid (Milgrom & Weber, 1982).
2 Each bidder knows the value of the object to herself, but does not know the values of the object to the
other bidders that are independent to her value.
3 ‘The common value theory allows for statistical dependence among bidders’ value estimates, but offers
no role for differences in individual tastes’ (Milgrom & Weber, 1982, p. 1095).
4 That includes accessibility, socioeconomic and environmental attributes.
5 After dropping by 1258 transactions due to incomplete data or errors.
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6 The t-stat of 22.43 rejects, at the 99 per cent level, the null hypothesis of the difference between the
means of the two distributions being zero.
7 Noise insulation is expected in areas with noise pollution problems, unfortunately we could not obtain
noise data to confirm this.
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Appendix A: Description of the variables used in the HP models
Variable name Variable description
Spricea Selling pricea
askpria Asking pricea
Bid_Premiuma The difference between the asking and selling pricea
LNPRICED Natural logarithm of Sprice
LNASKPRI Natural logarithm of askpri
LNBID Natural logarithm of Bid_Premium
DIST_AIR Distance to airport in kilometres
DIST_STA Distance to central train station in kilometres
DENSCHIL Children density – children aged 0–15 years per hectare
UNEMP The percentage of all 16–74-year olds who are unemployed COA
DETACHED 1 for detached houses, 0 otherwise
NODETACH 1 for terraced or semi-detached house, 0 otherwise
FLAT 1 for flats, 0 otherwise
BASEMENT 1 for basement flat, 0 otherwise
FLOOR2 1 for second floor flat, 0 otherwise
FLOOR3 1 for third floor flat, 0 otherwise
FLOOR4PL 1 for fourth floor flat or higher, 0 otherwise
FLOORUNK 1 for missing information on the floor number of flat, 0 otherwise
BEDR1 1 for houses with 1 bedrooms, 0 otherwise
BEDR2 1 for houses with 2 bedrooms, 0 otherwise
BEDR3 1 for houses with 3 bedrooms, 0 otherwise
BEDR4 1 for houses with 4 bedrooms, 0 otherwise
BEDR5 1 for houses with 5 bedrooms, 0 otherwise
BEDR6PL 1 for houses with 6 or more bedrooms, 0 otherwise
BEDRUNK 1 for missing bedroom number, 0 otherwise
PUBROM3P 1 for 3 or more public rooms, 0 otherwise
BATH2 1 for 2 or more bathrooms, 0 otherwise
GARAGE 1 for a house with garage(s), 0 otherwise
HEATING 1 for a house with gas central heating, 0 otherwise
GARDEN 1 for a house with garden, 0 otherwise
DETACHDO 1 for COAs with more than 50% detached houses, 0 otherwise
FLATDOM 1 for COAs with more than 50% flats, 0 otherwise
NODETA_D 1 for COAs with more than 50% terraced or semi-detached houses
NODOM 1 for COAs that are not dominated from a specific house type, 0
otherwise
SOCIAL_R 1 for COAs with more than 50% of social rented houses, 0 otherwise
PRIVRENT 1 for COAs with more than 50% of privately rented houses, 0
otherwise
VACANT 1 for COAs with more than 20% of vacant household spaces, 0
otherwise
OLD0_4 1 for COAs with more than 40% of the population over 60, 0
otherwise
ONEHH0_6 1 for COAs with more than 60% of one person households, 0
otherwise
No_quals 1 for COAs with more than 30% of people (aged 16–74) who have
no qualifications, 0 otherwise
CAR2D0_5 1 for COAs with 50% or more of the households owning 2 or
more cars
NOCARD 1 for COAs with 50% or more of the households not owning a car
GLAZING 1 for double glazing, 0 otherwise
TOM Time on the market (days)
Appendix Continued
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Appendix A: Continued
Variable name Variable description
DENSDWEL Dwelling density, dwellings per hectare
Y04Q01 . . .Y07Q4 Dummy variables for each quarter from 2004 to 2007, 1 for the sales
taking place in the specific quarter, 0 otherwise
DOM03Q04 . . .DOM07Q4 Dummy variables for Date on the Market (DOM) from the fourth
quarter of 2003 to 2007, 1 for the house going in the market in
the specific quarter, 0 otherwise
DOMBEFOR 1 for the house going in the market before the fourth quarter of 2003,
0 otherwise
a The selling and asking prices were adjusted to the price levels of the sale date or on the date the house
went on the market, respectively. The Bid_Premium was adjusted to the price levels of the sale date. The
official ONS deflator was used.
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Appendix B: Descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the models
Variable Mean Std dev. Min Max
Sprice 134 145 100 149 22 607 1 856 789
Askpri 105 223 79 737 15 373 1 088 193
Bid_Premium 28 555 26 649 303 881 789
LNPRICED 28 555 26 649 303 881 789
LNBID 11.62 0.59 10.03 14.43
LNASKPRI 9.92 0.88 5.71 13.69
DIST_AIR 7.715 2.513 0.722 56.79
DIST_STA 3.196 2.753 0.095 65.61
DENSCHIL 2.360 2.033 0 19.81
UNEMP 0.100 0.300 0 1
DETACHED 0.273 0.445 0 1
NODETACH 0.001 0.032 0 1
FLAT 0.059 0.235 0 1
BASEMENT 0.005 0.070 0 1
FLOOR2 0.002 0.040 0 1
FLOOR3 0.334 0.472 0 1
FLOOR4PL 0.285 0.451 0 1
FLOORUNK 0.387 0.487 0 1
BEDR1 0.068 0.252 0 1
BEDR2 0.019 0.138 0 1
BEDR3 0.007 0.083 0 1
BEDR4 0.011 0.105 0 1
BEDR5 0.081 0.273 0 1
BEDR6PL 0.035 0.183 0 1
BEDRUNK 0.220 0.414 0 1
PUBROM3P 0.793 0.405 0 1
BATH2 0.521 0.500 0 1
GARAGE 0.066 0.248 0 1
HEATING 0.278 0.448 0 1
GARDEN 0.067 0.250 0 1
DETACHDO 0.078 0.269 0 1
FLATDOM 0.058 0.234 0 1
NODETA_D 0.048 0.215 0 1
NODOM 0.218 0.413 0 1
SOCIAL_R 0.181 0.385 0 1
PRIVRENT 0.077 0.267 0 1
VACANT 0.188 0.391 0 1
OLD0_4 7.715 2.513 0.722 56.79
ONEHH0_6 3.196 2.753 0.095 65.61
No_quals 2.360 2.033 0 19.81
CAR2D0_5 0.100 0.300 0 1
NOCARD 0.273 0.445 0 1
GLAZING 0.001 0.032 0 1
DENSDWEL 49.31 50.29 0.03 1053
TOM 46.47 55.23 2.00 2834
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Appendix C: HP model on the sale price for positive bid-premium observations
.
Variable Coef. SEa t Variable Coef. SEa t
Y04Q1 20.7818 0.0129 260.40 HEATING 0.1369 0.0079 17.28
Y04Q2 20.6872 0.0122 256.37 GARDEN 0.0566 0.0116 4.89
Y04Q3 20.7121 0.0113 262.91 DETACHDO 20.0131 0.0378 20.35
Y04Q4 20.6989 0.0120 258.16 NODETA_D 20.0211 0.0197 21.07
Y05Q1 20.6433 0.0122 252.81 NODOM 0.0566 0.0255 2.22
Y05Q2 20.5611 0.0113 249.63 SOCIAL_R 20.0527 0.0259 22.03
Y05Q3 20.5651 0.0115 249.05 PRIVRENT 20.1049 0.0281 23.73
Y05Q4 20.5265 0.0113 246.43 VACANT0 20.0330 0.0337 20.98
Y06Q1 20.4306 0.0128 233.59 OLD0_4 0.1356 0.0228 5.95
Y06Q2 20.3391 0.0109 231.02 ONEHH0_6 20.0210 0.0168 21.25
Y06Q3 20.2649 0.0109 224.40 No_quals 20.2496 0.0172 214.47
Y06Q4 20.2203 0.0114 219.40 CAR2D0_5 0.1792 0.0296 6.06
Y07Q1 20.0711 0.0123 25.76 NOCARD 20.1442 0.0162 28.88
Y07Q2 0.0439 0.0109 4.01 GLAZING 20.0788 0.0107 27.34
Y07Q3 0.0228 0.0109 2.10 DENSDWE 20.0007 0.0001 25.30
DIST_AIR 0.0147 0.0023 6.48 Constant 12.1678 0.0315 386.09
DIST_STA 20.0279 0.0025 211.36
UNEMP 20.0098 0.0032 23.05
DETACHED 0.1268 0.0192 6.61
NODETACH 0.0423 0.0145 2.91
BASEMENT 20.2550 0.0514 24.97
FLOOR2 0.0132 0.0099 1.34
FLOOR3 0.0699 0.0439 1.59
FLOOR4PL 0.0767 0.1177 0.65
FLOORUNK 20.0325 0.0058 25.57
BEDR1 20.5249 0.0129 240.81
BEDR2 20.1604 0.0093 217.34
BEDR4 0.1923 0.0141 13.69
BEDR5 0.3934 0.0229 17.16
BEDR6PL 0.6065 0.0375 16.17
BEDRUNK 20.8260 0.0273 230.29
PUBROM3P 0.2468 0.0110 22.53
BATH2 0.1459 0.0186 7.85
GARAGE 0.1582 0.0108 14.65
Adj. R 2: 0.8211 N: 17 354 F(48, 1663):
612.962017.61
Prob . F: 0
a Cluster adjusted standard errors on COA, no. of clusters: 1664.
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Appendix D: The HP model on the asking price for positive bid-premium
observations
Variable Coef. SEa t Variable Coef. SEa t
DOMBEFOR 20.7206 0.0345 220.89 GARAGE 0.1508 0.0108 13.97
DOM03Q4 20.6977 0.0222 231.44 HEATING 0.1303 0.0080 16.30
DOM04Q1 20.6591 0.0174 237.93 GARDEN 0.0364 0.0121 3.01
DOM04Q2 20.6119 0.0165 237.06 DETACHDO 0.0076 0.0406 0.19
DOM04Q3 20.5996 0.0168 235.66 NODETA_D 20.0253 0.0205 21.23
DOM04Q4 20.5897 0.0169 234.85 NODOM 0.0639 0.0255 2.50
DOM05Q1 20.5220 0.0171 230.52 SOCIAL_R 20.0439 0.0285 21.54
DOM05Q2 20.4845 0.0169 228.67 PRIVRENT 20.1044 0.0258 24.05
DOM05Q3 20.4880 0.0165 229.56 VACANT0 20.0220 0.0353 20.62
DOM05Q4 20.4328 0.0177 224.52 OLD0_4 0.1361 0.0249 5.47
DOM06Q1 20.3872 0.0173 222.37 ONEHH0_6 20.0185 0.0174 21.06
DOM06Q2 20.3151 0.0155 220.28 No_noquals 20.2509 0.0181 213.85
DOM06Q3 20.2709 0.0165 216.43 CAR2D0_5 0.1787 0.0303 5.90
DOM06Q4 20.2263 0.0179 212.64 NOCARD 20.1431 0.0169 28.47
DOM07Q1 20.0986 0.0174 25.68 GLAZING 20.0650 0.0105 26.17
DOM07Q2 20.0302 0.0162 21.86 DENSDWEL 20.0009 0.0001 26.35
DOM07Q3 0.0085 0.0164 0.52 Constant 11.91054 0.0343845 346.39
DIST_AIR 0.0148 0.0022 6.63
DIST_STA 20.0265 0.0025 210.39
UNEMP 20.0093 0.0033 22.84
DETACHED 0.1619 0.0200 8.10
NODETACH 0.0520 0.0152 3.42
BASEMENT 20.2455 0.0437 25.62
FLOOR2 0.0235 0.0102 2.29
FLOOR3 0.0969 0.0438 2.21
FLOOR4PL 0.1039 0.1495 0.69
FLOORUNK 20.0204 0.0060 23.41
BEDR1 20.5678 0.0131 243.49
BEDR2 20.1762 0.0094 218.66
BEDR4 0.2147 0.0140 15.29
BEDR5 0.4201 0.0226 18.57
BEDR6PL 0.6287 0.0346 18.17
BEDRUNK 20.8575 0.0267 232.08
PUBROM3P 0.2513 0.0113 22.30
BATH2 0.1578 0.0192 8.23
Adj. R 2: 0.8168 N: 17 354 F(48, 1663): 541.8217.61 Prob . F: 0
a Cluster adjusted standard errors on COA, no. of clusters: 1664.
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Appendix E: The HP model for private treaty sales and negative bid-premiums
Variable Coef. SEa t Variable Coef. SEa t
Y04Q1 20.9172 0.0430 221.31 GARDEN 20.0242 0.0280 20.87
Y04Q2 20.7866 0.0743 210.59 DETACHDO 0.0562 0.0777 0.72
Y04Q3 20.7049 0.0400 217.61 NODETA_D 20.0560 0.0374 21.50
Y04Q4 20.7308 0.0372 219.66 NODOM 0.0532 0.0448 1.19
Y05Q1 20.6383 0.0433 214.74 SOCIAL_R 20.0912 0.0588 21.55
Y05Q2 20.6193 0.0474 213.05 PRIVRENT 20.1054 0.0508 22.08
Y05Q3 20.5898 0.0366 216.10 VACANT0 0.0319 0.0644 0.50
Y05Q4 20.5155 0.0342 215.06 OLD0_4 0.1380 0.0576 2.39
Y06Q1 20.4219 0.0417 210.12 ONEHH0_6 0.0178 0.0318 0.56
Y06Q2 20.2967 0.0393 27.56 No_quals 20.2463 0.0445 25.54
Y06Q3 20.2590 0.0330 27.85 CAR2D0_5 0.1643 0.0517 3.18
Y06Q4 20.2052 0.0301 26.82 NOCARD 20.1501 0.0314 24.78
Y07Q1 20.0667 0.0473 21.41 GLAZING 20.0004 0.0324 20.01
Y07Q2 0.0586 0.0295 1.99 DENSDWEL 20.0017 0.0003 25.45
Y07Q3 0.0129 0.0246 0.52 Constant 12.15545 0.065975 184.24
DIST_AIR 0.0211 0.0047 4.47
DIST_STA 20.0312 0.0055 25.66
UNEMP 20.0045 0.0062 20.72
DETACHED 0.1240 0.0510 2.43
NODETACH 0.0175 0.0351 0.50
FLOOR2 20.0356 0.0319 21.12
FLOOR3 0.2119 0.0704 3.01
FLOOR4PL 0.2830 0.0945 3.00
FLOORUNK 20.0432 0.0213 22.02
BEDR1 20.5807 0.0354 216.41
BEDR2 20.1529 0.0299 25.11
BEDR4 0.1992 0.0340 5.85
BEDR5 0.3422 0.0627 5.46
BEDR6PL 0.5175 0.1161 4.46
BEDRUNK 20.9710 0.0490 219.82
PUBROM3P 0.2907 0.0417 6.98
BATH2 0.1622 0.0426 3.81
GARAGE 0.1184 0.0314 3.78
HEATING 0.1398 0.0225 6.20
Adj. R 2: 0.833 N: 1320 F(47, 693):
140.062017.61
Prob . F: 0
a Cluster adjusted standard errors on COA, no. of clusters: 694.
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